In the first two chapters, author Michael Goodman, a lecturer at Kings College London, looks at the origins and development of the Soviet nuclear program, the British-American efforts to learn about it, and the consequences of the surprise Soviet explosion of their first atomic bomb — Joe-1 — in 1949. In his introductory comments about chapter 3, “Atomic Spies and Defectors,” Goodman asserts that “a characteristic of the 1950–54 period was the success of Soviet espionage in penetrating British and American political, scientific, and intelligence circles.” (2) In the chapter itself, he discusses specific agents, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Donald Maclean, John Cairncross and Ted Hall.
But historians of espionage may take issue with aspects of this assessment. For example, the characteristic of Soviet atomic espionage in the 1950–54 period was failure, not success.10 By that time, each of those mentioned had been identified and dealt with. Moreover, Goodman does not refer to the impact of GRU defector Igor Gouzenko or the Rosenbergs that, together with VENONA, brought Soviet atomic espionage to a halt by the end of the 1940s. Finally, his assertion that “it was not until Kim Philby had been identified as a a Soviet spy that British intelligence realized just how extensive Soviet espionage was,” is just not supported by the facts.(84) The Soviet atom spies had all been neutralized by then.11
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf — Central Intelligence Agency
